The global nuclear renaissance: setting the stage for Asia

A global reassessment of nuclear energy - termed the ‘nuclear renaissance’ - is reshaping energy policies in the United States and Europe. This shift is driven by energy security imperatives, volatile fossil fuel markets and binding decarbonisation targets. In the US, executive actions aim to quadruple nuclear capacity to 400GW by 2050 through streamlined regulations.

This ambition aligns with surging electricity demand from data centres and AI, projected to double globally by 2030. Concurrently, Europe’s Net-Zero Industry Act and European SMR Alliance signal a coordinated push for next-generation nuclear technologies. 

In Asia, the momentum for the development of utility-scale nuclear generation is also building. The region now accounts for more than two-thirds of global new reactor construction. China alone accounted for almost half of global expansion in 2024 and it targets – if achieved – could propel it to top producer globally by 2035. This development drive addresses the double challenge faced by large manufacturing economies such as China and India: bringing down carbon emissions while increasing the supply of affordable electricity (which is key to them remaining competitive). Recent developments, such as the referendum on restarting a plant in Taiwan, show gradual shifts in the public perception of nuclear power generation.

These shifts in development and sentiment come as financing options reopen for nuclear projects. For investors and industry, Asia offers both scale and diversity - from large producers continuing (or restarting) builds, to new entrants. This dynamic landscape is set to shape the future of nuclear power and the region’s energy mix for decades to come.

Asia’s nuclear landscape: five markets dominate existing capacity

Asia’s operational nuclear fleet is concentrated in five key markets. China leads, adding new reactors at a record pace. Japan and Korea maintain large fleets, while India and Pakistan steadily expand theirs.

Mainland China has a fleet of 57 reactors with a capacity of 55.3GW(e), a dramatic rise from just 2 plants in 2002. Most reactors were connected to the grid after 2010.

Japan operates 33 reactors (31.7GWe), though only 14 (13.25GWe) have restarted under post-Fukushima safety standards. It has not connected to the grid any new reactor since 2009, and more than half of its reactors were built before 1990 (its oldest operational reactor was connected in 1974).

South Korea operates 26 reactors (25.8GWe). It has regularly connected new reactors to the grid since the first one (now shutdown) in 1977.

India has 25 reactors (8.88GWe) across 8 sites. It has regularly connected new reactors to the grid since 1980, and all operational reactors were connected during or after that year.

Pakistan’s 6 reactors (3.53GWe) operate at 2 locations. All operational reactors were connected on or after 2000.

Policy shifts driving growth: continuers, restarters and new entrants

Nuclear in Asia: A two-decade story of mixed growth

Continuing buildup: China and Korea

• Mainland China is constructing 29 new reactors - nearly half of all global nuclear new builds. Backed by state-driven energy security and decarbonisation goals, it aims to approve 6 to 8 projects annually, and the current 5-year plan targets reaching a capacity of 200GW(e) by 2035, positioning China to become the world’s largest nuclear producer by capacity (currently held by the US with a capacity of 96.5GW(e)).
• Korea, by contrast, only has 2 nuclear reactors in construction and has had a less stable nuclear energy policy in the past few years. While more modest and cautious, it is effectively continuing to develop its nuclear generation capacity. Challenges include:
• The NIMBY effect: despite Korea’s strong safety record, local opposition to nuclear facilities remains high.
• Geographic mismatch: most reactors are in southeastern regions relatively far from urban centres like Seoul and industrial locations on the west coast.
• ‘Stop-start’ uncertainty: changes in policies brought in by successive governments, from phase-outs to expansion.

Reversing course to restart efforts: Japan and Taiwan

• Japan seems to have all but abandoned its post-Fukushima nuclear phase-down, now accelerating reactor restarts, extending plant lifespans and supporting next-gen technologies. Public sentiment, relatively hostile to nuclear after the Fukushima accident, seems to be now shifting toward nuclear to power industries and meet climate targets, with a goal of 20 to 22% nuclear electricity by 2030.
• Taiwan, which cancelled a new build project following the Fukushima accident and had Taipower phase out its nuclear capacity, revised legislation in May 2025 to allow nuclear plant license extensions, potentially restarting decommissioned reactors. A referendum was held on 23 to decide on the restart of Maanshan-2 plant. Despite voters being in favour of the restart (74% votes for), the turnout rate was too low for the referendum proposal to be considered passed under Taiwan law.

New entrants: nuclear aspirants emerge

Instability in the price of energy vectors and trade wars have led a number of countries who do not have operating utility scale reactors to actively consider, and procure, utility scale nuclear generation capacity.

These include Kazakhstan (the world's top uranium producer), as well as countries with no nuclear connection such as Bangladesh (which is aiming to commission its first reactor (Rooppur, 2x1,200 MW VVER reactor built by Rosatom in 2025), Vietnam and the Philippines.

Major EPC contractors in Asia’s nuclear build-out

Key nuclear EPC companies competing for new projects in Asia include China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), Electricité de France (EDF), GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom (Rosatom) and Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

• Each has its own reactor design, with EDF, GE-Hitachi and Westinghouse often viewed as offering more modern (but more complex and costly) designs. Their competitors are often viewed as proposing older, but more mature and field-tested designs, based on an 'evolutionary' approach.
• Diplomatic engagement usually accompanies the efforts of these contractors, because of the cost, complexity and sensitivity of utility scale nuclear projects.

Current project pipeline: opportunities and new projects gaining traction

• Kazakhstan: The world’s top uranium producer recently awarded its landmark $15 billion nuclear plant near Lake Balkhash to Russia’s Rosatom after a competitive tender that saw bids from Western (EDF), Chinese (CNNC), and South Korean (KHNP) firms. Rosatom is set to construct 2 1,200MW VVER-1200 reactors, with a target completion date of 2029. Publicly available information suggests the government is hoping to involve the other shortlisted bidders in the delivery of the project, and that the construction by CNNC of a second plant is under discussion, while financing arrangements remain in negotiation.
• Vietnam: Vietnam revived its nuclear strategy, pursuing 4 - 6.4GWe by 2030 to 2035 through the Ninh Thuan project. State-owned EVN and PetroVietnam will develop the 4,000MW Ninh Thuan project via direct negotiations. The Vietnamese government is currently reported to be in discussions with companies from Russia, Japan, Korea, and France and is aiming to complete the plan in 2030–2031.
• Indonesia: The country now has a target of achieving 10GWe capacity by 2040. Plans for a 500MW plant (West Kalimantan/Bangka Belitung) are advancing, with a new legal framework expected in 2025.
• Philippines: Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) is conducting a feasibility study on rehabilitating the Bataan plant—a cautious step toward 1,200MW by 2032.

Key legal considerations: navigating global and regional nuances

Financing breakthrough: MDBs embrace nuclear

A pivotal shift occurred in June 2025 when the World Bank ended its nuclear financing ban. They will now fund reactor life extensions, grid upgrades, and SMRs - driven by geopolitical competition (countering Russia/China’s 85% cost coverage in projects like Egypt’s). Other MDBs, such as the ADB, are rumoured to be reviewing their own bans on funding nuclear projects.

A new partnership between the World Bank and the IAEA (June 2025) could also help to provide technical oversight and financing pathways.

In addition, in 2024 14 global banks (including Bank of America and Barclays) endorsed nuclear expansion following the COP28 pledge to triple nuclear capacity by 2050.

All of these could unlock funding for new projects in emerging economies (including in Asia), which have traditionally seen the very high cost of entry of nuclear, as a significant challenge.

Looking ahead: strategic imperatives for stakeholders

Asia presents an interesting and dynamic landscape in the global nuclear renaissance, with a mix of established nuclear powers, policy restarters and ambitious new entrants driving significant developments.

The region’s growing energy needs, combined with decarbonisation goals and energy security concerns, position nuclear energy as an increasingly viable solution. However, the pathway to growth is not without challenges. Nations must navigate regulatory complexities, establish stable investment frameworks and address geopolitical and supply chain risks.

The recent shift by multilateral development banks to support nuclear financing offers a critical opportunity to accelerate projects across the region. As stakeholders work to balance innovation with the reliability of proven technologies, Asia’s evolving nuclear journey will undoubtedly play a key role in shaping the global energy transition.