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End of the road: High Court confirms payroll tax applies to Uber driver payments

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On 4 November 2026, the High Court of Australia dismissed Uber’s appeal in Uber Australia Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2026] HCA 40. By a 6:1 majority (Steward J in dissent), the Court upheld payroll tax assessments of approximately $81.5 million issued under the contractor provisions in Division 7 of Part 3 of the Payroll Tax Act 2007 (NSW) for the 2015 to 2020 financial years.  Uber collected fares from riders, deducted the service fee it charged drivers, and paid the balance to drivers. The assessments levied payroll tax on those balances.

The High Court’s decision largely affirms a series of recent payroll tax cases in which the New South Wales and Victorian state revenue authorities have sought to apply the contractor provisions in various ‘gig economy’ settings. Having succeeded at first instance, Uber’s victory was overturned unanimously by a specially constituted five-judge bench of the NSW Court of Appeal (see our earlier alert, Uber appeal: taxpayer alert), with the High Court now affirming that decision. Importantly, however, the majority did not simply rubber-stamp the Court of Appeal’s reasoning. It placed Uber’s liability on a narrower and, in our view, more principled footing. In summary, the High Court found that Uber had services supplied to it by drivers under their contract with Uber (i.e. the contract in question fell within the statutory meaning of a ‘relevant contract’), based on a close construction of that contract and the obligations owed under it, rather than by reference to a more nebulous concept of a ‘financial benefit’ that Uber could be said to have derived from the drivers’ work. Further, the High Court held that it did not matter that Uber collected and remitted amounts to drivers (less a service fee) under a payment agency arrangement – a payment made under such an arrangement is still caught as statutory ‘wages’ where it relates to work performed in relation to a ‘relevant contract’.

This is the first occasion on which the High Court has considered the application of the payroll tax contractor provisions to marketplace and platform operators, and its reach could now extend beyond rideshare businesses. The contractor provisions are deeming provisions: they create a legal fiction of an employer/employee relationship for payroll tax purposes only. Where a contract is a ‘relevant contract’ (s 32), the person to whom services are supplied under it is taken to be an employer (s 33), the person performing the work is taken to be an employee (s 34), and amounts paid or payable for or in relation to that work are taken to be wages (s 35). The consequence of the decision is that marketplaces and intermediaries may now be deemed to be employers of the service providers who use their platforms. The decision is likely to affect businesses that provide services to businesses or individuals who in turn serve their own customers, where the operator prescribes standards to which that work must be performed and controls the flow of customer payments before passing them on. Businesses operating these models can expect state revenue authorities across all jurisdictions (other than Western Australia) to rely on the decision to guide compliance and audit activity, and to test their current business models and arrangements against the High Court’s reasoning.

Key takeaways

  1. Supply of services to Uber – The High Court majority held that the transportation provided by drivers to riders also constituted ‘driving services’ supplied to Uber for payroll tax purposes, because under cl 3 of the ‘Driver Contract’ each driver agreed with Uber that riders would be transported directly to their specified destination. The Court did not find that Uber was the recipient of the transportation in place of the rider. Rather, the performance of the service was an obligation owed by each driver to Uber which was enlivened, at the latest, when a ride was accepted and a trip had begun, notwithstanding that the obligation to perform the service might also have been an obligation owed by the driver under a separate contract between driver and rider.
  2. “Under” a contract – The joint judgment held that services are supplied “under” a contract for the purposes of s 32(1) at least where the contract is the source of the obligation to supply them. Because the Court had found that each driver’s obligations to Uber arose under cl 3 of the Driver Contract, there was no need to consider any broader readings favoured by the Court of Appeal (including that a service is supplied ‘under’ a contract where the contract governs or controls the supply of the services or confers a right to be paid) and expressly left the outer bounds of s 32(1)(b) open. It did not matter that drivers could decline any trip: like a casual employee, a driver was bound once the work began.
  3. The ‘ancillary to the use of goods’ exclusion – Uber sought to rely on the exclusion in s 32(2)(a) for services “ancillary … to the use of goods”, arguing that the drivers’ personal services merely enabled and assisted the use of their own cars. The joint judgment rejected that submission as “misconceived”: the primary object of the Driver Contract was the supply of driving services, not the use of the driver’s car. Gageler CJ reached the same result, reasoning that the use of the car was not of greater contractual significance than the work of driving it.
  4. Paid or payable – The High Court agreed with the Court of Appeal (and disagreed with the first instance judgment) that fares remitted by Uber to drivers (net of service fees charged to drivers) were deemed to be wages under s 35(1). The connection between the remitted amounts and the drivers’ work was clear. The description of Uber as a “limited payment collection agent” was not determinative: the joint judgment considered that Uber’s contractual rights to adjust or cancel fares before remitting them went beyond merely collecting and passing on fares, such that Uber was not a mere collection agent. Gageler CJ reached the same result, but on the basis that Uber collected fares as the drivers’ agent.
  5. The broader framework – The decision confirms that the definition of “relevant contract” is intentionally wide, with the statutory exclusions (rather than any implied limitation drawn from the purpose of the contractor provisions) doing the work of carving out arrangements that are not intended to be caught. Although Parliament could not have foreseen the contracting models used in the gig economy when these provisions were drafted, the provisions are flexible enough to encompass them.
  6. Where to next? – The High Court’s decision has broad application to marketplace/platform operators like Uber, but the reasoning is likely to equally apply to other businesses that provide facilities or services to professionals who in turn provide services to their own clients, where: (i) a degree of control over the manner and standard of performance by the recipient of the facilities/services is necessary to protect the reputation, usability and attractiveness of the facilities/services provider; and (ii) the overall arrangement involves the interposition of the facilities/services provider in the collection and remittance of payment from clients to the recipient of the facilities/services. Examples include operators of clinics in the health services sector (as in Thomas and Naaz Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2023] NSWCA 40 (Thomas and Naaz) and in Commissioner of State Revenue v The Optical Superstore Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 197 (Optical Superstore)). Operators of these business models should expect increased scrutiny by state revenue authorities following the outcome in Uber. It will be important for such operators to consider whether any of the statutory exclusions to the contractor provisions in s 32(2) can be relied upon. Not all of these exclusions were considered by the High Court in Uber and their application will be fact dependent. They include: (i) where the services are provided for less than 90 days in a financial year; (ii) where the same services are ordinarily performed by the person to the public generally; and (iii) where the person providing the services engages one or more other persons in the provision of the services.

Background

Uber’s rideshare platform

Uber operates what the High Court described as “a rideshare system”, matching riders seeking transportation by car with drivers through its Rider App and Driver App. Drivers and riders each contract with Uber on standard terms (the Driver Contract and the Rider Contract). The Driver Contract describes Uber as a provider of “lead generation services” (expressly stipulating that it is not a provider of transportation services to riders) and appoints it as each driver’s “limited payment collection agent”: Uber collects the fare from the rider, deducts its service fee and pays the balance to the driver. Of central importance to the High Court’s decision was cl 3 of the Driver Contract pursuant to which each driver agreed with Uber that riders “should be transported directly to their specified destination, as directed by the [rider], without unauthorised interruptions or stops”. Various other clauses in the Driver Contract specified the standards required to be met by drivers in transporting riders.

Uber emphasised other aspects of the Driver Contract, including acknowledgements that the driver has sole responsibility for obligations or liabilities to riders, that the provision of driving services creates a legal and direct business relationship between driver and rider, and that payment by a rider to Uber (in its capacity as limited payment collection agent) should be considered the same as payment made directly by the rider to the driver.

The first instance decision

The Chief Commissioner of State Revenue assessed Uber as liable to payroll tax of approximately $81 million for the financial years ended 30 June 2015 to 30 June 2020, on the basis that the amounts Uber remitted to drivers were deemed wages under the contractor provisions. Uber’s objections were disallowed, and it sought review in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

At first instance, Hammerschlag CJ in Eq revoked the assessments. Although his Honour found that the Driver Contract was a ‘relevant contract’, he held that the amounts Uber remitted to drivers were not paid “for or in relation to the performance of work” under s 35(1), meaning that the amounts were not subject to payroll tax as ‘wages’. For further detail, see our earlier alert, “Five-Stars”: Uber’s victory in Court puts brakes on payroll tax assessments.

The road to the High Court

The Chief Commissioner appealed the primary judge’s finding that the amounts remitted to drivers were not paid “for or in relation to the performance of work”. Uber, in turn, cross-appealed the primary judge’s findings that the Driver Contracts were relevant contracts and that the exclusion in s 32(2)(a) did not apply.

In August 2025, a specially constituted five-judge bench of the Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Chief Commissioner’s appeal and dismissed Uber’s cross-appeal, with costs (Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Uber Australia Pty Ltd [2025] NSWCA 172 (CA)). The Court upheld Hammerschlag CJ in Eq’s finding that the Driver Contracts were relevant contracts and that the exclusion in s 32(2)(a) did not apply but reversed the trial judge’s finding that the remitted amounts were not deemed wages under s 35(1). The Court of Appeal’s reasoning on each issue was as follows:

  • Supply under the Driver Contracts – driving was a service supplied to Uber because it “clearly generates a financial benefit for Uber in the form of a service fee and is the foundation of Uber’s business insofar as it concerns ridesharing”. As we noted in our earlier alert, this emphasis on financial benefit was the most contestable aspect of the Court’s reasoning. The Court further held that the circumstances in which a service could be said to be supplied ‘under’ a contract extended beyond cases in which the contract was the source of the obligation to supply the services. A service would also be provided ‘under’ a contract where the contract governs or controls the supply of the services or confers a right to be paid for them - the Court found that both of these extended formulations applied to the driving service and rating service (but not the referring service) in respect of the Driver Contracts.
  • No ancillary exclusion – the driving service and the use of the vehicle were “inseparable and practically intertwined”, and the use of the vehicles was not the principal or dominant feature of the Driver Contracts.
  • Deemed wages – the primary judge’s requirement of reciprocity or calibration put “an unsupportable gloss” on s 35(1). The remitted amounts were calculated by reference to the driving, less Uber’s fee, so there was “a direct relationship between the performance of work and what was payable by Uber to drivers”, notwithstanding that Uber’s payment was accounting for what had been paid to it by riders. The Court further found that Uber’s position as payment agent was not distinguishable from the fact pattern considered in Optical Superstore and Thomas and Naaz, and declined to depart from those earlier appeal court decisions.

For further detail, see our earlier alert.

The High Court’s decision

Uber advanced three issues for determination in its appeal to the High Court:

  1. Did drivers supply services to Uber under a “relevant contract” within the meaning of s 32(1)(b)?
  2. Were the driving services “ancillary … to the use of goods” within the meaning of s 32(2)(a)?
  3. Were the amounts Uber remitted to drivers paid “for or in relation to the performance of work” and therefore deemed to be wages under s 35(1)?

The majority, comprising Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ in a joint judgment and Gageler CJ in a separate judgment, rejected each ground. Steward J dissented.

Issue 1: drivers supplied services to Uber under the Driver Contract

The issue before the High Court was whether the driving service was supplied to Uber and whether it was supplied under the Driver Contracts.

The High Court majority held that drivers supplied their driving services to Uber because, under cl 3 of the ‘Driver Contract’ entered into between Uber and each driver (absent which Uber would have no drivers for its rideshare business), each driver agreed with Uber that riders “should be transported directly to their specified destination, as directed by the [rider], without unauthorised interruptions or stops”. That was an obligation owed to Uber which was enlivened at the point in time when a ride was accepted and a trip had begun notwithstanding that it might also have been an obligation owed under a separate contract between the driver and rider. It was that contractual obligation owed to Uber (together with other more specific obligations in the Driver Contract relating to the standard and manner of performing the driving service), rather than the financial benefit Uber derived from the drivers' work, that was decisive: the majority made clear that the mere generation of a financial benefit would not have been sufficient to constitute a supply of services to Uber.

As to the question of whether the supply was under the Driver Contract, the joint judgment held that the phrase “a contract under which” in s 32(1) directs attention to the source of the obligation (which can be contrasted with the Court of Appeal’s broader formulations, including circumstances in which the contract merely ‘governs or controls the supply of the services’ or ‘confers a right to be paid’ for them). The joint judgment expressly declined to determine the “outer bounds” of s 32(1)(b). Gageler CJ was deliberately cautious, observing that it was unnecessary, and therefore undesirable, to go beyond the narrowest of the potential meanings identified by the Court of Appeal (i.e., that the contract is the source of the obligation).

The obligation in cl 3 to drive a rider to a specified destination was reinforced by other clauses of the Driver Contract concerning skill, care and professionalism, vehicle standards and insurance, and by Uber’s right to deactivate drivers who fell short of the quality standards set out in the separate “Community Guidelines” published by Uber and incorporated by reference into the Driver Contract.

Some aspects of the majority’s reasoning warrant particular emphasis:

  • Dual supply. The majority did not make an express finding of a separate contract between a driver and a rider under which the driver supplies the driving service to the rider. However, the Court made it clear that the existence of such a contract and such a supply would not change the result that, under cl 3 of the Driver Contract, the driver had an obligation under which it also supplied that service to Uber. Uber relied on an earlier High Court decision, Accident Compensation Commission v Odco Pty Ltd (1990) 64 ALJR 606, to argue that the driver’s performance of the driving service for the rider could only constitute a supply to Uber where it discharged an obligation that Uber had to provide the driving service to the rider (and Uber denied that it had any such obligation per the terms of the Rider Contract). The Court rejected this argument and held that it was sufficient to establish the supply of the driving service to Uber by examining the terms of the Driver Contract.
  • Obligation, not benefit. The joint judgment accepted that “the mere generation of a financial benefit to Uber is not sufficient” for the driving services to be supplied to Uber. Responding directly to the Court of Appeal’s reliance on a “sufficiently direct connection” between the driving and the benefits it generated, the joint judgment observed that a direct connection will not of itself amount to a supply. As an example, their Honours analogised that while a shopkeeper may benefit from a bus stopping on its regular route outside a store, that does not mean the bus operator supplies a service to the shopkeeper. What was considered to take the driving services beyond the mere generation of a benefit was the driver’s contractual obligation to Uber to supply particular driving services to a particular standard. Those services were considered to be “an essential component” of Uber’s rideshare business, over which Uber exercised substantial control.
  • No obligation to provide service: Nor did it matter that drivers were under no obligation to accept any trip. The joint judgment likened a driver to a casual employee: under no obligation to work on any particular occasion, but subject to obligations under the contract once the work commenced.
  • Payment arrangement: Uber’s further submission that its liability could not turn on “mere administrative payment arrangements” was also rejected. The application of s 32(1)(b) depended on the parties’ rights and obligations under the Driver Contract as a whole, and Uber’s collection of fares was, in any event, considered not to be a mere administrative arrangement: its recommended fare was effectively the required fare, and a driver’s right to charge less was a “notional freedom” given that Uber’s service fee was calculated on the recommended fare regardless.

Issue 2: the driving services were not ancillary to the use of the car

The joint judgment rejected Uber’s contention that the driving services were ancillary to the use of the drivers’ cars, reaching the same conclusion as the primary judge and the Court of Appeal. Relying on the extrinsic materials to the equivalent Victorian provisions, on which the NSW contractor provisions were based, the joint judgment held that the exclusion in s 32(2)(a) is directed to contracts the “primary object” of which is the use of goods. Applying that test, the joint judgment found that the primary object of the Driver Contract was the supply of driving services rather than the use of a car. In the joint judgment’s words, “[w]hat is sought by Uber (and by the rider) is the driver’s driving services, using a car”, which distinguished the Driver Contract from a contract for the use of a car, such as a car-sharing service. The joint judgment also distinguished an example given in the extrinsic materials, of machinery sent for testing on another party’s equipment, in which the primary object of the contract was to obtain the benefit of the supplier’s equipment, not the labour that may have been ancillary to it. Here, “neither Uber nor the rider seeks the benefit of the driver’s car without the driver (nor the driver without their car)”: both were “central to the service required”, and neither could be described as incidental. Gageler CJ agreed, drawing on the legislative history recounted in the joint judgment and observing that the use of the vehicle was not of greater contractual significance than the work of driving it.

Issue 3: the remitted fares were deemed wages

The joint judgment held that the fares Uber remitted to drivers were amounts paid “for or in relation to the performance of work” under s 35(1) and were therefore deemed to be wages. As a starting point, the majority noted that s 35 is a deeming provision which creates its own concept of “wages”, so that ordinary expectations of what constitutes wages are of limited relevance to its construction. The phrase “for or in relation to the performance of work” requires a connection between the amount provided and the performance of work, and that connection was readily established: the more driving a driver did, whether measured by distance or number of trips, the more Uber remitted. Gageler CJ similarly emphasised the “direct relationship” between the work and the amounts payable that resulted from the manner in which the fare and the service fee were calculated and rejected Uber’s contention that s 35(1) requires a payment in the nature of a quid pro quo for work performed for the deemed employer, as failing to accord with the generality of the statutory text.

Uber argued that amounts paid to drivers pursuant to an obligation to account for moneys to which the drivers were already entitled(i.e. amounts remitted as “limited payment collection agent”) were excluded from s 35(1). The joint judgment rejected Uber’s characterisation of itself as a mere “limited payment collection agent”, noting that the labels parties use to describe their relationship are not determinative and emphasising Uber’s contractual rights to adjust a fare unilaterally or cancel it entirely. These rights were found to be inconsistent with Uber’s argument that it was merely remitting amounts to which the driver was entitled upon Uber’s receipt of it. As the joint judgment observed, “Uber has structured its rideshare system business so that payments from riders are funnelled through it”, giving it substantive control over the fares before they are remitted. That Uber might have structured its business so that riders paid drivers directly, which it did not, did not bear on the proper construction of s 35(1). Gageler CJ arguably went further, relying on Optical Superstore and Thomas and Naaz to conclude that payments within the scope of s 35(1) could include payment of an amount to which a deemed employee is beneficially entitled, or to which the deemed employee has a contractual entitlement to be paid by someone other than the deemed employer.

The dissent

Steward J would have allowed the appeal on the grounds that (i) there was no supply to Uber under a relevant contract and (ii) the amounts remitted to drivers were not paid or payable “for or in relation to the performance of work”, which left it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the ‘ancillary to the use of goods’ exclusion was engaged. His Honour characterised Division 7 as an anti-avoidance regime directed to arrangements that disguise what are in substance the “emoluments of employment” and drew a critical distinction between receiving a service and merely benefiting from a service supplied to someone else, concluding that it was riders, not Uber, who actually received the driving services. On s 35, his Honour applied the causal meaning of “for” explained in Commissioner of Taxation v PepsiCo Inc [2025] HCA 30, and concluded that, in remitting fares, Uber was simply discharging its promise to riders to collect and remit the fare. His Honour also respectfully doubted the observation in Optical Superstore that it is not pertinent to ask whether the amounts in question resemble wages in the ordinary sense.

Observations

The contractor provisions have wide application to the gig economy

Part of Uber’s case that there was no ‘relevant contract’ rested on an argument that Division 7 was aimed at bringing within the payroll tax base disguised employment, and at the time it was introduced could not have contemplated a digital platform that does no more than connect riders and drivers. Uber argued that Division 7 was aimed at the “mischief” of employers engaging new staff as contractors, or converting existing employees to contractor status, neither of which was apt to describe Uber’s rideshare platform. Uber said that its platform was a marketplace, not a labour hire arrangement. Both majority judgments rejected Uber’s framing of Division 7 as limited in scope. Gageler CJ considered that the generality of the provisions, and their object of protecting the payroll tax base from shifts in workplace practices, meant that their application “may vary over time”. The joint judgment accepted that Parliament could not have foreseen the gig economy, but found that the extrinsic materials supported, rather than undermined, the application of the provisions to it. According to the joint judgment, the concept of ‘relevant contract’ is intentionally wide, with specific exclusions to exempt transactions not meant to be caught. Only Steward J, in dissent, relied on Division 7’s purpose as an anti-avoidance regime to confine its breadth.

In our view, the application of the contractor provisions to platform operators like Uber reaches beyond the intended scope of those provisions when they were originally introduced in the 1980s. Rideshare drivers are, in substance, operators of their own businesses with their own vehicles, contract with and earn their fares from passengers, have no obligation to accept any trip, and often work across several platforms or as taxi and/or delivery drivers. The outcome in the Uber case also produces anomalies:  payroll tax applies to rideshare fares but not to taxi fares (which have not historically been subject to payroll tax), nor does it apply to courier or food deliveries, even when the same driver performs such services in the same vehicle. 

Contract terms, not commercial benefit, are decisive

In our previous alert, we took issue with the Court of Appeal’s reliance on the financial benefit Uber derived from drivers’ work. The High Court has largely answered that concern: benefit alone is not enough. Liability in Uber’s case instead turned on what drivers promised Uber under cl 3 of the Driver Contract, and on the standards Uber imposed and enforced. This clarification is welcome, but it does not necessarily prescribe a narrower test in practice.

In practice, marketplace/platform operators like Uber, as well as businesses that provide facilities or services to professionals who in turn provide services to their own clients, are likely to impose obligations with respect to the manner and standard of performance by the service provider to the end-user. Even though such obligations enure to the benefit of and are intended to protect the interests of the end-user (as well as the platform operator’s reputation, usability and attractiveness), the fact that they are imposed under a contract between platform operator and service provider will likely result in that contract being a ‘relevant contract’ under Division 7. It should also be noted that the majority left open the “outer bounds” of the test for when services are provided under a contract.

Increased reliance on statutory exclusions

The majority judgment noted that while the concept of ‘relevant contract’ is intentionally wide, the statutory exclusions are engaged to limit the scope of arrangements caught by Division 7. Following the High Court’s decision, we anticipate that taxpayers are likely to increase reliance on the exclusions in s 32(2). These exclusions include: (i) where the services are provided for less than 90 days in a financial year; (ii) where the same services are ordinarily performed by the person to the public generally; and (iii) where the person providing the services engages one or more other persons in the provision of the services.

The ‘public generally’ exclusion was raised by Uber at first instance, on the basis that some drivers also undertook taxi or hire car work. The Chief Commissioner conceded that the exclusion applied to some drivers, but the Court ultimately held that Uber had failed to lead evidence as to the frequency of taxi or hire car work by drivers and accordingly it could not be established that any drivers were ordinarily engaged in providing those services to the public generally. With regulatory change and the maturity of the rideshare industry, it is now more likely that rideshare drivers provide services across multiple channels – including other rideshare and booking platforms, as well as taxi and hire car services. Taxpayers seeking to rely on the exclusion will need to carefully consider the evidence required to support its application.   

Control over payment flows is critical

Only Gageler CJ expressly endorsed Thomas and Naaz and Optical Superstore, holding that s 35(1) captured payments which are remittances of amounts to which a deemed employee is already beneficially entitled. The joint judgment did not directly address that contention – instead distinguishing the facts at hand from those cases and finding that Uber was not a mere “limited payment collection agent” because it retained rights to adjust or cancel fares. As such, it is unclear whether the outcome would have been different had Uber not had those rights. Pragmatically, we do not expect that the High Court is likely to revisit the issue any time soon. As such, taxpayers should continue to assume that Thomas and Naaz and Optical Superstore remain operative law on this issue.

Revenue authorities are likely to step up scrutiny

It is expected that, in light of the Uber decision, other State revenue authorities (other than Western Australia) will focus on contractor arrangements with platform operators and facilities/service providers that act as payment intermediaries. Businesses relying on a statutory exclusion should validate that their position can be substantiated for each relevant open year.

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