‘Truth-in-takeovers’ requires bidders, targets and substantial shareholders to stand behind public statements made as part of proposed control transactions. This includes ‘best and final’ statements that a bidder will not improve the consideration offered under its bid. We’ve seen bidders try to weasel out of these a number of times but more recently targets are probing into best and final statements to find ways to increase an offer through the use of dividends.
Takeovers Panel guidance states a bidder that declares an offer ‘best and final’ cannot improve its offer within four months after its offer closes.
If the target declares a dividend not expressly accounted for in a bidder’s best and final statement, what are the implications?
The UK position is clear. Under Rule 32.2 Note 5 of the City Code, if a target pays a dividend after a bidder makes a ‘no-increase’ statement (the UK equivalent of a best and final statement), the bidder will normally be required to reduce its offer price by the dividend amount to maintain the same overall value for shareholders, unless the offer expressly stated shareholders could retain the dividend in addition to the offer.
However, Australia has no equivalent default.
The leading authority is Rinker Group Ltd 02 [2007] ATP 17. In that case, bidder CEMEX announced its offer for Rinker was ‘best and final’ on 10 April 2007. CEMEX’s bidder statement entitled it to deduct dividends from its offer price, with a catch-all: ‘If Bidder, does not, or cannot, make such a deduction, you must pay that amount to Bidder’. When Rinker declared a final dividend on 27 April 2007, CEMEX subsequently announced it would allow shareholders to retain the final dividend without exercising its right to reduce the offer price.
The Takeovers Panel found this was a departure from CEMEX’s best and final statement. The Panel’s reasoning was that even though the headline price had not changed, CEMEX had not clearly reserved the right to let shareholders keep future dividends, and that by permitting shareholders to keep the dividend, CEMEX had effectively improved the consideration under its bid in departure from its best and final statement.
The lesson from Rinker is clear: silence or ambiguity around dividends means flexibility. Nearly two decades later, the regulatory landscape has not changed, but target behaviour has. Two high-profile takeover attempts involving BlueScope and Atlas Arteria this year show how bidders’ attempts at preserving flexibility are being thwarted by targets who are willing to test the limits of bidders’ drafting.
When drafting is (deliberately) ambiguous: BlueScope and Atlas Arteria
SGH and Steel Dynamics / BlueScope
On 18 February 2026, the SGH and Steel Dynamics consortium declared their A$32.35 per share offer for BlueScope as ‘best and final’. The price was expressed as equivalent to A$34.00 prior to deducting A$1.65 in dividends already announced by BlueScope. The offer was conditional on ‘no further capital or dividends to shareholders not already announced or paid prior to Tuesday 17 February 2026’ unless adjusted for in the offer price.
BlueScope's board responded that it had already announced on 16 February 2026 its plans to distribute A$3.00 per share in 2026, comprising the A$1.65 already deducted plus a further A$1.35. The Board argued the effective consideration was therefore only A$31.00 per share, accusing the bidders of ‘proposing to retain the benefit of all the cash flow of BlueScope effectively from 1 July 2025’. The board also noted:
‘Notwithstanding your ‘best and final statement’, we consider that there are various ways to increase the value that BlueScope shareholders could receive’.
The takeover did not progress, but the exchange exposed the risk of ambiguous drafting. BlueScope exploited uncertainty about whether its pre-announced distribution programme fell within scope of the best and final statement. A bidder in this position faces an uncomfortable choice: adjust the price to account for the full dividend and risk departing from a best and final statement (and potential regulatory action), or hold firm and risk shareholders perceiving they are losing value.
IFM Investors / Atlas Arteria
On 27 April 2026, IFM declared its A$5.10 per share offer for Atlas Arteria as ‘best and final’. The statement reserved the right to reduce the offer price by any distribution declared during the offer period. Separately, IFM committed not to acquire shares above A$5.10 for 12 months after close of the offer period, but that commitment did not address whether the A$5.10 threshold would itself be adjusted for distributions paid after the offer period.
Atlas Arteria’s board spotted the gap. While IFM had addressed distributions during the offer period, for the purposes of the offer price, in an attempt to give itself some wiggle room, it had not stated whether distributions paid after close would reduce the A$5.10 cap on subsequent acquisitions. Atlas contended shareholders could potentially receive the A$5.10 offer plus any distributions paid after close of the offer period, and reserved the right to bring forward its 2026 distributions.
IFM closed the gap in a supplementary statement, clarifying that the A$5.10 cap on subsequent acquisitions of shares would also be reduced by any distributions paid in the 12 months after the close of the offer period. This shows that even careful drafting may leave openings, and targets will look for them.
EQT / Perpetual
The same issues have emerged again in the latest skirmish between financial services business Perpetual and Swedish private equity firm, EQT.
It started with a $21.64 all-cash bid on 1 July (which was rejected by the Perpetual board), followed by 2 successive offers increasing headline offer consideration to $22.50 per share, both of which were also rejected. EQT then lodged its ‘best and final’ proposal (in the absence of a competing proposal), which maintained the same A$22.50 cash consideration but allowed the Perpetual board to declare and pay a dividend of up to 60 cents per share, without any adjustment to the offer consideration – in other words, a potential total consideration package of $23.10 (unfranked) for Perpetual shareholders, depending on the size of the dividend.
However, on 21 September, Perpetual (now for the fourth time) rejected the revised proposal. This would have seemingly killed off any chance of a transaction, with EQT now facing a 4-month exclusion. What then to make of recent media speculation that EQT is considering a further bid within this period? Based on the above cases, it would seem an offer that maintains the same headline consideration but is adjusted for a permitted dividend (ie. a BlueScope-style approach) would be a lower offer than EQT’s previous ‘best and final’ offer, and they would be able to make this bid without falling foul of the truth in takeovers provisions.
Practical considerations for bidders who want to avoid price bumps
Without a baseline regulatory position on the impact of dividends on ‘truth in takeovers’ statements and targets eager to squeeze more value from bidders, careful drafting is the bidder’s only protection. There are three practical takeaways:
- Address dividends expressly. State whether the offer price will be reduced by dividends declared during the offer period, or whether shareholders may retain them. The BlueScope exchange shows the cost of leaving this to inference.
- Cover the post-offer period. IFM’s offer addressed distributions during the offer period but not afterwards - a gap Atlas Arteria identified. Consider whether your commitment should extend beyond the offer period. This is particularly relevant for a bidder who is willing to own less than 100% for a period of time and come back to the remaining shareholders with a higher price at a later point in time (whether through another bid or by creeping once the 6 months are up).
- Ensure the dividend timetable aligns with the offer timetable. Saying shareholders may keep a dividend as part of an offer is not enough if the offer can close before they are entitled to it. Certain Panel decisions (such as in the case of CKI’s takeover of Envestra Limited in 2014), note that denying shareholders the opportunity to receive a previously-announced dividend by virtue of an offer closing may give rise to ‘serious questions’ where the Panel considers the bidder to have made ‘truth in takeovers’ statements regarding entitlement to a dividend.[1]
Bidders should not expect sympathy from the Panel for ambiguity either. The Panel’s recent decision in Dropsuite Limited [2025] ATP 10 (where the shareholder who made a voting intention statement sold shares before the vote) reinforces the point that ambiguity in public statements will generally be resolved against the maker. If a statement is capable of more than one interpretation, the burden falls on the maker to have been clearer.
Australia’s regulatory silence on dividends is unlikely to change soon. Rinker remains the guide, and BlueScope and Atlas Arteria show targets are willing to test its limits. For bidders, the message is simple: be explicit, be comprehensive, and assume targets and greenmailers will try to exploit any gap in your truth.
See Envestra Limited [2014] ATP 13.
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