Contests have been a defining feature of public M&A in 2026 and listed targets are increasingly running a competitive auction process to drive up the offer price.
This is nothing new in a private sale but has historically been less common in public transactions as parties contend with continuous disclosure obligations, limitations on exclusivity and increased regulatory and court oversight. Given this increased complexity, what are the key practical considerations when you find yourself in a public M&A auction?
Market disclosure: a double-edged sword
oOh!media, FleetPartners, EQT Holdings, Webjet, Insignia Financial – the list goes on. There have been many competitive transactions on the ASX in 2025/26, but they all started the same way, with an interested bidder making an unsolicited non-binding indicative offer (NBIO).
Deal snapshot: oOh!media / I Squared Capital
- On 29 April 2026, PEP’s unsolicited NBIO of $1.40 per share was disclosed by oOh!media to ASX which triggered a public competitive process that ran for around three months.
- There were multiple unsolicited NBIOs submitted by a group of private equity bidders, including I Squared, Pacific Equity Partners and Oaktree Capital, which signed NDAs in late May 2026 and received phased due diligence access.
- On 10 August 2026, I Squared signed a binding scheme implementation agreement at $1.70 per share implying an enterprise value of $1.04 billion.
- On 2 November, oOh!media shareholders approved the scheme and implementation is expected to occur on 10 December 2026.
There is no blanket obligation to announce every NBIO. The ASX Listing Rules permit non-disclosure of a confidential, incomplete proposal, and the Takeovers Panel recently accepted that a target board has wide discretion over when to disclose a confidential NBIO.
However, public disclosure is often the most effective way to flush out rival bidders and create competitive tension. The disclosure of an NBIO will let the market know that the target is ‘in play’, but it comes at a cost:
- it sets an expectation that the market will be kept informed of further NBIOs and developments – and every update must be accurate and not misleading
- disclosing a price may simply set a floor, telling rival bidders exactly what they need to beat rather than drawing out their best price, and
- once a sale process is in the media, the ASX will call for a public statement if any speculation in relation to the target becomes reasonably specific or market moves appear referable to it.
For these reasons, a bidder will typically prefer that any NBIO remains confidential, while accepting that media leaks or ASX queries may force disclosure before they are ready for a public contest. To protect against this, some NBIOs state that they are automatically withdrawn if disclosed (eg. EQT AB’s approach for Perpetual). However, this approach can lead to a credibility problem as the bidder often continues discussions with the target following the bid becoming public.
MFNs: the price of equal treatment
Sophisticated bidders who know they are in a competitive process are increasingly negotiating most favoured nation (MFN) provisions in NDAs.
An MFN requires the target to ensure that none of the NDAs with other bidders contain more favourable terms. MFNs are a useful protection for bidders against asymmetric terms but a target need not treat bidders equally, so leverage is required to secure one.
Once agreed, MFNs create significant logistical issues for the target in trying to align terms across multiple NDAs, particularly where there are multiple bidders and sponsors arrive with their own NDA ‘playbook’. A common difficulty arises when an initial NDA has been agreed without an MFN, before later NDAs with MFNs are signed - the earlier NDA may need to be ‘walked back’ before the target signs the subsequent NDAs or it will be in immediate breach.
These difficulties can be mitigated by limiting the MFN to key terms (such as standstill duration and exclusivity), excluding bidder-specific terms (such as IT security protocols) and ensuring it operates prospectively only.
Standstills and voting: keeping the losers out of the vote
In a scheme, the 75% by value and majority headcount tests mean that even a modest stake can block a deal. For this reason, the target and the successful bidder will be aligned in ensuring that unsuccessful bidders – having had their chance to put their best foot forward – cannot derail the scheme.
This is achieved by ensuring the NDAs contain a comprehensive standstill which restricts stakebuilding, competing proposals and soliciting proxies or board seats. A properly constructed standstill is a powerful deterrent against losing bidders but enforcement is the weak point. By the time an injunction is sought, the shares may have been acquired or the vote affected.
Locking it in: the SID
The scheme implementation deed (SID) will contain various provisions that protect the integrity of the competitive process. Alongside customary no-shop, no-talk and no due diligence restrictions, bidders should require the target to promptly enforce any NDA with other bidders, including the standstill and voting restrictions given in its favour.
These protections cannot be used to suppress a superior control outcome. So, how do you protect against an unsuccessful bidder submitting a superior proposal following completion of the auction process and execution of the SID?
Historically, it has been left to the Board to determine whether a competing proposal is superior. We are starting to see alternate formulations proposed which include additional requirements:
- In oOh!media, any losing bidder had to beat the scheme consideration by at least 3% in order for it to be considered a superior proposal. However, after discussions with ASIC, this 3% hurdle was confined to the 4-week period after signing.
- In FleetPartners, a superior proposal had to provide a ‘materially’ more favourable outcome, with materiality being determined by reference to factors the Board considers relevant (having regard to the Court’s decision in SG Fleet Group Limited).
Where to from here?
It remains to be seen whether the market will continue to push away from traditional exclusivity and superior proposal mechanics as bidders look to bridge the differences between private and public competitive processes. For bidders and targets alike, the challenge will be adapting the auction playbook while maintaining competitive tension and deal certainty.
Read More In This Edition
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Paying for permanence: the hunt for durable income
Monday 19 October 2026 captured the state of Australian public M&A with ASX-listed Cleanaway Waste Management announcing a binding scheme implementation deed with EQT Infrastructure at an implied enterprise value of about A$9.3 billion and ASX-listed Challenger disclosing a non-binding A$11.80 per share proposal from TAL Daiichi Life Australia.
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Public M&A market on a page: January - October 2026
Public M&A activity remains concentrated in large transactions and the Metals & Mining sector, while completion periods have increased materially.
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